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Abstract 
This paper provides an efficient method to measure utility under prospect theory, the most 
important descriptive theory of decision under uncertainty today. Our method is based on the 
elicitation of certainty equivalents for two-outcome prospects, a common way to measure 
utility. We applied our method in an experiment and found that most subjects were risk 
averse for gains and risk seeking for losses but had concave utility both for gains and for 
losses. This finding illustrates empirically that risk seeking and concave utility can coincide 
under prospect theory, a result that was derived theoretically by Chateauneuf and Cohen 
(1994). Utility was steeper for losses than for gains, which is consistent with loss aversion. 
Utility did not depend on the probability used in the elicitation, which offers support for 
prospect theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, utility measurement has assumed that people behave according to 
expected utility. Then a decision maker’s utility can be measured by eliciting a few 
equivalences between prospects. Evidence abounds, however, that people violate expected 
utility in systematic ways (Starmer 2000) and that utility measurements based on expected 
utility give inconsistent results (Hershey and Schoemaker 1985, Bleichrodt, Pinto, and 
Wakker 2001, Abdellaoui, Barrios, and Wakker 2007). An obvious danger of basing utility 
measurement on a theory that is descriptively invalid is that the obtained utilities will be 
biased and that recommendations are made that are not in the decision maker’s best interests. 
Two important causes of violations of expected utility are probability weighting, the 
nonlinear evaluation of probabilities, and loss aversion, the finding that people evaluate 
outcomes as gains and losses relative to a reference point and are more sensitive to losses 
than to gains. Both probability weighting and loss aversion are modeled by prospect theory, 
currently the most influential descriptive model of decision under risk. A difficulty in 
measuring utility under prospect theory is that the methods that are commonly used to 
measure utility, such as the probability, certainty equivalence, and lottery equivalence 
methods (Farquhar 1984, McCord and de Neufville 1986) are no longer valid because they do 
not take account of probability weighting and loss aversion. Wakker and Deneffe's (1996) 
trade-off method is robust to probability weighting when all outcomes are of the same sign, 
but is not able to handle loss aversion. 
The main problem in measuring utility under prospect theory is the presence of 
probability weighting, in particular the possibility that probability weighting can be different 
for gains and losses. Several studies solved this problem by assuming parametric forms for 
probability weighting (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Booij and van de Kuilen 2006). 
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (forthcoming) derived a nonparametric method to 
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completely measure utility under prospect theory, i.e. their method imposed no assumptions 
on utility, probability weighting, and loss aversion. Nonparametric measurements offer three 
important advantages over parametric measurements. First, the measurements are not 
confounded by assumptions about the shape of utility or probability weighting. Second, the 
measurements provide insight in the psychological processes underlying the measurements 
because there is a direct link between choices and utilities. Third, the direct link between 
choices and utilities allows solving inconsistencies in utility measurement, which is important 
for prescriptive decision making. Observed inconsistencies can be directly related to 
particular choices and solving these inconsistencies will give new insights into the decision 
maker’s preferences. Under parametric assumptions there is no direct link between choices 
and utilities. A drawback of nonparametric measurements is that they are generally less 
efficient, in the sense that more questions are needed to elicit utility, and more susceptible to 
response error than parametric measurements. 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a new method to measure utility under 
prospect theory that seeks to achieve a balance between the advantages of nonparametric and 
parametric measurements. The key insight behind our method is that only the decision weight 
of one probability needs to be known to measure utility. This insight reduces the number of 
measurements and thereby enhances the scope for application of prospect theory in empirical 
research and practical decision making. Because we only need the weight of one probability 
our method requires no assumptions about probability weighting. The method is based on the 
elicitation of certainty equivalents of prospects involving just two outcomes, a widely used 
method in applied research. The different certainty equivalents are not linked and, hence, not 
susceptible to error propagation. For utility, we adopt a parametric specification, the power 
function. Our decision to select a parametric specification for utility is based on previous 
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findings that the power function provides an excellent fit to utility measurements (for an 
overview see Stott 2006).  
We applied our method in an experiment and found concave utility both on the gains 
domain and on the loss domain. There was clear evidence of loss aversion both at the 
individual and at the aggregate level. Even though we observed concave utility for losses, 
most of our subjects were risk seeking for losses. This observation shows that the one-to-one 
relationship between risk aversion and utility curvature that exists under expected utility no 
longer holds under prospect theory. Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994, Corollary 4) derived 
theoretically that risk seeking behavior and concave utility can coincide under prospect 
theory. Our finding can be interpreted as the empirical counterpart to Chateuneuf and Cohen 
(1994). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prospect theory and previous 
empirical evidence on utility, probability weighting and loss aversion under prospect theory. 
Section 3 describes our method for eliciting prospect theory. Section 4 describes the design of 
an experiment in which our method was applied. Section 5 describes the results of our 
experiment and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Prospect Theory 
We consider a decision maker who has to make a choice between risky prospects. 
Because we will only use prospects with at most two distinct outcomes, we restrict the 
discussion to such prospects. On the domain of two-outcome prospects original prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and new (or cumulative) prospect theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992) coincide, and hence our derivations and estimations are valid for both 
theories.  
We write (x, p; y) for the prospect that results in outcome x with probability p and in 
outcome y with probability 1−p. The individual has preferences over prospects and we use 
 6
the conventional notation ê, í, and ~ to represent the relations of strict preference, weak 
preference, and indifference. Outcomes are real numbers, they are money amounts in the 
experiment eported in Section 4. Higher numbers are always preferred. If x = y or p = 0 or p 
= 1 the prospect is riskless, otherwise it is risky. Outcomes are expressed as changes with 
respect to the status quo or reference point, i.e. as gains or losses. Throughout the paper, we 
assume that the reference point is 0. Hence, gains are outcomes larger than 0 and losses 
outcomes less than 0. A mixed prospect involves both a gain and a loss; otherwise the 
prospect is non-mixed. For notational convenience, we assume that all prospects (x, p; y) are 
rank-ordered. If a non-mixed prospect involves only gains [losses], we assume that x  ≥ y ≥ 0 
[x ≤ y ≤ 0]. For mixed prospects we assume that x > 0 > y. 
 
Utility and probability weighting for gains and losses 
 The individual evaluates each prospect and chooses the prospect that offers the 
highest overall utility. The overall utility of a prospect is expressed in terms of three 
functions: a probability weighting function w+ for gains, a probability weighting function w− 
for losses, and a utility function U.  The functions w+ and w−  assign a probability weight to 
each probability. They are strictly increasing and satisfy w+(0) = w−(0) = 0 and w+(1) = w−(1) 
= 1. The utility function U assigns a real number to each outcome, which reflects the 
desirability of that outcome. The function U is strictly increasing and satisfies U(0) = 0. U is 
a ratio scale, i.e. we can arbitrarily choose the unit of the function. 
The evaluation of a prospect depends amongst other things on the sign of the 
outcomes. If the prospect (x, p; y) is non-mixed then its utility is 
 
ws(p)(U(x)−U(y)) + U(y),      (1) 
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where s = + for gains and s = − for losses. The intuition behind (1) is that the decision maker 
gains [loses] at least U(y), regardless of how the uncertainty is resolved, and may gain [lose] 
an additional ws(p)(U(x)−U(y)). If the prospect (x, p; y) is mixed then its utility is 
 
w+(p)U(x) + w−(1−p)U(y).      (2) 
 
Expected utility concerns the special case of (1) and (2) where w+(p) = w−(p) = p. 
 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) assumed that the probability weighting functions w+ 
and w− overweight small probabilities and underweight moderate and high probabilities, 
giving rise to an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function. The utility function is 
assumed to be concave for gains and convex for losses, implying an S-shaped utility function, 
and steeper for losses than for gains. The combination of these assumptions entails a fourfold 
pattern of risk attitudes: risk aversion for small-p losses and larger-p gains and risk seeking 
for larger-p losses and small-p gains. Loss aversion implies strong risk aversion for mixed 
prospects. Empirical evidence supports these predictions (e.g. Laughhunn, Payne, and Crum 
1980; Payne, Laughhunn, and Crum 1980, 1981; Schoemaker 1990; Myagkov and Plott 
1997; Heath, Huddart, and Lang 1999). 
 Most empirical studies on probability weighting observed inverse S-shaped 
probability weighting both for gains and for losses (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Tversky 
and Fox 1995; Wu and Gonzalez 1996; Gonzalez and Wu 1999; Abdellaoui 2000; Bleichrodt 
and Pinto 2000). The point where the probability weighting changes from overweighting 
probabilities to underweighting probabilities lies around ⅓. Tests of functional forms for the 
probability weighting function have produced equivocal results. After adjusting for degrees 
of freedom, Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), and Sneddon and Luce 
(2001) observed that two-parameter forms fitted better than single-parameter forms. Wu and 
 8
Gonzalez (1996) and Stott (2006) on the other hand found that the single-parameter models 
performed at least as good as the two-parameter models. 
Measurements of the shape of utility for gains and for losses have generally 
confirmed prospect theory’s assumption of concave utility for gains and convex utility for 
losses. The available evidence is stronger for gains than for losses. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) assumed power utility and found a median power coefficient of 0.88 both for gains 
and for losses. These estimates are consistent with an S-shaped utility function. A 
disadvantage of Tversky and Kahneman’s estimation is that they had to assume a parametric 
form for probability weighting. Gonzalez and Wu (1999) found that this specification was 
rejected for most of their subjects. Camerer and Ho (1994), Wu and Gonzalez (1996), and 
Stott (2006) also adopted parametric forms but only estimated the utility for gains. Their 
results were consistent with concave utility for gains.   
Baucells and Heukamp (2006) performed a test of prospect theory based on stochastic 
dominance relations and found support for an S-shaped utility function. Their method also 
required prior qualitative assumptions about probability weighting.  
Several studies have used Wakker and Deneffe’s (1996) trade-off method to perform 
separate measurements of the utility for gains and the utility for losses and, hence, their 
findings were not affected by probability weighting. Fennema and van Assen (1998), 
Abdellaoui (2000), Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber (2005), Schunk and Betsch (2006), 
and Abdellaoui, Barrios, and Wakker (2007) found that the utility for gains was concave both 
at the aggregate level (median power coefficients were generally between 0.77 and 0.91 with 
the exception of Fennema and van Assen (1998) who obtained median power coefficients of 
0.21 and 0.39) and for the majority of their subjects. Empirical support for convex utility for 
losses was weaker. Fennema and van Assen (1998), Abdellaoui (2000), Etchart-Vincent 
(2004), Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber (2005), and Schunk and Betsch (2006) found 
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slightly convex utility for losses at the aggregate level (median power coefficients varied 
between 0.84 and 0.97). At the individual level, the most common pattern was convex utility 
for losses (between 24% and 47% of the subjects), but concave and linear utility functions 
were also common. 
 Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (forthcoming) estimated the utility for gains 
and losses simultaneously, i.e. they performed a complete elicitation of utility under prospect 
theory, and did not make any assumptions about utility or probability weighting. They found 
strong support for the S-shaped utility function both at the aggregate and at the individual 
level.  For their median data, the power estimates were 0.72 for gains and 0.73 for losses. 
Seventy percent of their subjects had concave utility for gains and also 70% had convex 
utility for losses. Fifty-four percent had an S-shaped utility function. Recently, Booij and van 
de Kuilen (2006) proposed another method to measure the utility for gains and losses 
simultaneously. They also found support for S-shaped utility, with mean power coefficients 
of 0.94 for gains and 0.90 to 0.93 for losses. The method of Booij and van de Kuilen (2006) 
does not estimate probability weighting but, instead, specific assumptions about probability 
weighting have to be imposed. They assumed that probability weighting could be modeled by 
the one-parameter form of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and imposed the median parameter 
obtained by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) on all of their subjects. Hence, they did not allow 
for individual heterogeneity in probability weighting. 
 
Loss aversion 
Many empirical studies have observed qualitative support for loss aversion. Few 
studies have, however, performed quantitative estimations of loss aversions. To measure loss 
aversion the utility for gains and losses must be measured simultaneously and, as mentioned 
before, until recently no method existed to perform such a measurement without imposing 
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additional assumptions. An additional complication in the measurement of loss aversion is 
that there is no agreed-upon definition of loss aversion. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
suggested that loss aversion be defined by −U(−x) > U(x) for all x > 0. This implies that a 
loss aversion coefficient can be defined as the mean or median of −U(−x)U(x)  over relevant x. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) implicitly used −U(−$1)U($1)  as an index of loss aversion. 
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) defined the loss aversion coefficient as, 
U ′↑(0)
 U ′↓(0)
 where U ′↑(0) 
stands for the left and U′↓(0) for the right derivative of U at the reference point. This 
definition can be considered the limiting case of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) definition 
for x approaching 0. A similar definition was suggested by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). 
Wakker and Tversky (1993) used a stronger definition of loss aversion and required that 
U′(−x) ≥ U′(x) for all x > 0, i.e. the slope of the utility function at each loss is at least as large 
as the slope of the utility function at the absolutely commensurate gain. Their definition could 
be related to a loss aversion coefficient of the mean or median of 
U′(−x)
U′(x)  .  Neilson (2002) and 
Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) proposed other definitions but these are difficult to 
apply empirically as was shown by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (forthcoming). 
Schmidt and Zank (2005) proposed a behavioral definition of loss aversion, which is 
equivalent to the definition of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) on the domain of prospects 
considered in this paper. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the studies that estimated a loss aversion coefficient. 
Bleichrodt, Pinto, and Wakker (2001) estimated two loss aversion coefficients using different 
datasets. Bleichrodt et al. (2007) estimated six loss aversion coefficients. Booij and van de 
Kuilen (2006) estimated separate loss aversion coefficients for high and low monetary 
 11
amounts. Except for Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (forthcoming), all studies adopted 
parametric assumptions about utility and probability weighting, but the assumptions that were 
adopted differed across studies. Besides, different definitions of loss aversion were used. The 
estimated values for the coefficient of loss aversion vary, but are hard to compare because of 
the different assumptions and definitions used and because some studies reported median 
values and the others mean values. 
 
Table 1: Estimates of the Loss Aversion Coefficient 
Study Definition Domain Estimates 
Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) U′(−x) U′(x)   Money 4.8 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) −U(−1)U(1)   Money 2.25 
Bleichrodt, Pinto, and Wakker (2001) −U(−x)U(x)   Health 
2.17 
3.06 
Schmidt and Traub (2002) U′(−x) U′(x)   Money 1.43
* 
Pennings and Smidts (2003) U′(−x) U′(x)   Money 1.81
* 
Bleichrodt et al. (2007) −U(−x)U(x)   Health 1.53-2.13 
−U(−x)
U(x)   
1.72  
2.15* 
U′(−x)
 U′(x)   
1.53 
2.02* Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv. (forthcoming) 
U′↑(0)
 U ′↓(0)
  
Money 
2.52 
4.99* 
Booij and van de Kuilen (2006) 
U′↑(0)
 U ′↓(0)
  Money 1.79
* 
1.74* 
   * denotes a mean value. Otherwise it is a median value. 
 
The estimates in Table 1 are based on aggregate data. Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and 
Paraschiv (forthcoming) also studied loss aversion at the individual level and found that a 
large majority of their subjects behaved according to loss aversion under the definitions of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Wakker and Tversky (1993), and Köbberling and Wakker 
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(2005). In contrast, Schmidt and Traub (2002), who used the definition of Wakker and 
Tversky (1993), found that only 33% of their subjects were loss averse.  
 
3. Elicitation Method 
 Our elicitation method consists of three stages. In the first stage utility is elicited on 
the gain domain, in the second stage utility is elicited on the loss domain, and in the third 
stage the utility on the gain domain and on the loss domain are linked. All measurements are 
based on the elicitation of certainty equivalents for two-outcome prospects. The certainty 
equivalents of different elicitation questions are not chained. This has the advantage that error 
propagation does not affect our findings.  
Like Köbberling and Wakker (2005), we assume that the observable utility U in 
prospect theory is a composition of a loss aversion coefficient λ > 0, reflecting the different 
processing of gains and losses, and a basic utility u that reflects the intrinsic value of 
outcomes for the agent. This decomposition was also adopted by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), Shalev (2000), and Bleichrodt, Pinto, and Wakker (2001). Formally, this assumption 
means that 
( ) 0
( )
( ) 0.
u x if x
U x
u x if xλ
≥⎧= ⎨ <⎩        (3) 
 The exact definition of loss aversion depends on the specification of u. We will return 
to this issue later. 
 
Elicitation of utility on the domain of gains and on the domain of losses 
Consider first the elicitation of utility on the gain domain. We start by selecting a 
probability pg that is kept fixed throughout the elicitation of the utility function on the gains 
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domain. We choose a series of prospects (xi, pg; yi), for which xi > yi ≥ 0, i = 1,...,k. and elicit 
their certainty equivalents Gi. By (1) and (3) it follows that 
 
u(Gi) = δ+(u(xi)−u(yi)) + u(yi)      (4)  
or  
Gi = u−1(δ+(u(xi)−u(yi)) + u(yi)),      (5)  
 
where δ+ = w+(pg). The advantage of keeping the probability pg fixed is that only one point of 
the probability weighting function plays a role in the process of utility elicitation. The 
probability weight δ+ can just be taken to be one additional parameter that has to be estimated 
in the utility elicitation exercise. In fact, if we adopt a parametric specification for utility, then 
(5) can easily be estimated through nonlinear least squares. In the experiment described 
below we adopted the most widely used parametric specification, the power function u(x) = 
xα. Then  
 
Gi = (δ+(xiα − yiα) + yiα)1/α,       (6)  
 
where α and δ+ are the parameters to be estimated. The parameter α reflects the curvature of 
the utility function and δ+ reflects the impact of probability weighting at probability pg. Under 
expected utility we only need to measure α. Note that the adoption of a power function 
implies the scaling u(1) = 1. 
 
 14
Figure 1: The impact of probability weighting on utility measurement 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the impact of probability weighting on utility measurement when δ+ < 
pg, i.e. when probabilities are underweighted. The figure shows that underweighting of 
probabilities will exert a downward impact on the elicited utilities compared with expected 
utility, the case in which there is no probability weighting. Because utility is unique up to unit 
and location we can fix the utility of two outcomes. In the figure, we have fixed the utility of 
the outcomes xi and yi. Expected utility then posits that the utility of Gi is equal to 
pg(u(xi)−u(yi)) + u(yi). This exceeds δ+(u(xi)−u(yi)) + u(yi), the utility of Gi under prospect 
theory, when probabilities are underweighted. Consequently, analyzing the data under 
expected utility will overestimate the concavity of utility on the gains domain when 
probabilities are underweighted. A similar analysis reveals that expected utility will 
underestimate the concavity of utility on the gains domain when probabilities are 
overweighted. Figure 1 also shows that if the underweighting of probabilities is strong 
enough then risk aversion can co-exist with linear or even convex utility. In the figure the 
Money xi Gi yi 
u assuming EU 
Utility 
u(xi) 
u(yi) 
pg[u(xi)-u(yi)] + u(yi) 
δ+[u(xi)-u(yi)] + u(yi) u assuming PT 
Bias 
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utility function under expected utility is concave indicating risk aversion. However, if δ+ is 
sufficiently low then the utility function can be convex under prospect theory. Hence, the 
one-to-one relationship between risk aversion and concave utility, which exists under 
expected utility, no longer exists under prospect theory. This observation was formally 
proved by Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994). 
 The procedure to elicit the utility on the domain of losses is largely similar to the 
procedure described above for gains. We select pl = 1 − pg and a series of prospects (xi, pl, yi) 
for which 0 ≥ yi > xi , i = 1,...,k and elicit their certainty equivalents Li. The reason we set pl = 
1−pg  is that this equality is crucial in the estimation of loss aversion. By (1) and (3) it follows 
that 
 
Li = u−1(δ−(u(xi)−u(yi)) +u(yi),      (7)  
 
where δ− = w−(pl). By adopting a parametric specification for u we can estimate (7) by 
nonlinear least squares. Underweighting of probabilities now entails that expected utility will 
underestimate the concavity of utility on the loss domain and overweighting of probabilities 
entails that expected utility overestimates the concavity of utility on the loss domain.  
Because we only use the weight of one probability we do not have to make 
assumptions regarding probability weighting in the estimation of (5) and (7). Moreover, (5) 
and (7) can be estimated at the individual level and, hence, individual heterogeneity in 
probability weighting is taken into account. 
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Measuring loss aversion 
 The third stage of our elicitation procedure serves to establish the link between the 
utility for gains and the utility for losses and, hence, measures the loss aversion coefficient 
λ. This can be done through the elicitation of a single indifference. Select a gain G* from 
within (0,xk], the interval for which u was determined in the first stage and determine the loss 
L* for which (G*, pg; L*) ~ 0. It follows from (2), (3) and pl = 1 − pg that  
 
δ+u(G*) + δ−λu(L*) = u(0) = 0.     (8) 
 
Because δ+, u(G*), δ−, and u(L*) are known from the estimation of (5) and (7), (8) uniquely 
determines λ.  
 
4. Experiment 
Subjects 
 Subjects were 48 (25 female) graduate students in economics and mathematics at the 
Ecole Normale Supérieure, Antenne de Bretagne, France. They were paid €10 for their 
participation. In addition, one subject was randomly selected to play out one of the gain 
questions with the actual payment divided by 10. For ethical reasons we could not play out 
for real one of the loss questions or one of the mixed questions. Several pilot sessions were 
used to test and fine-tune the experimental design. 
 
Procedure 
 The experiment was run on a computer. Responses were collected in personal 
interview sessions. Subjects were told that there were no right or wrong answers and that they 
were allowed to take a break at any time during the session. The responses were entered into 
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the computer by the interviewer, so that the subjects could focus on the questions. Before the 
experiment started subjects were given several practice questions. The experiment lasted 60 
minutes on average, including 15 minutes for explanation of the tasks and practice questions. 
 All indifferences were elicited through a series of binary choices. Each binary choice 
corresponded to an iteration in a bisection process, which is described in Appendix B. After 
each choice the subject was asked to confirm his choice. We used a choice-based elicitation 
procedure because previous studies have found that inferring indifferences from a series of 
choices leads to fewer inconsistencies than asking subjects directly for their indifference 
values (Bostic, Herrnstein, and Luce 1990). In each choice a subject was faced with two 
prospects, labeled A and B, where prospect A was always riskless. Prospects were displayed 
as pie charts with the sizes of the slices of the pie corresponding to the probabilities. 
Appendix A gives two examples of the way the experimental questions were displayed. To 
control for response errors, we repeated the first iteration after the final iteration. The 
iteration process was started anew when a subject changed his choice in the repeat of the first 
iteration. 
 
Stimuli 
 We used 6 certainty equivalence questions to elicit the utility function for gains and 6 
certainty equivalence questions to elicit the utility function for losses. The prospects for 
which we determined the certainty equivalents are displayed in Table 2. We used substantial 
money amounts to be able to detect curvature of utility; for small amounts utility is 
approximately linear (Wakker and Deneffe 1996). We used round money amounts, multiples 
of €1000, to facilitate the task for the subjects. As shown by the table, the measurements were 
not chained and, hence, not vulnerable to error propagation. 
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Our method also allows examining the validity of prospect theory with utility equal to 
(3). As a first test, we elicited the certainty equivalents for two different values of pg,  pg = ½ 
and pg = ⅔ and, consequently, pl = ½ and pl = ⅓ for losses. Under prospect theory we should 
observe no systematic differences between the utility elicited with pg = ½ and the utility 
elicited with pg = ⅔. For losses no difference should be observed between the utility elicited 
with pl = ½ and the utility elicited with pl = ⅓. 
 
Table 2: Questions asked to determine the utility for gains and the utility for losses 
Outcome index i  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
6xi6 2000 4000 6000 10000 10000 10000 
6yi6 0 0 0 0 6000 8000 
 
  
The order in which the 24 certainty equivalents were elicited was random. At the end 
of the elicitation of the utility for gains and the elicitation for losses we repeated the third 
iteration for eight questions, four for gains (two for pg = ½ and two for pg = ⅔) and four for 
losses (two for pl = ½ and two for pl  = ⅓). The questions that were repeated were determined 
randomly. 
 To determine the loss aversion coefficients, we selected G*1,…,G
*
6 and determined L
*
j  
such that (G*j, ½; L
*
j) ~ 0, j = 1,…,6. Our method only needs one indifference to elicit the loss 
aversion coefficient λ. We used 6 questions to have another test of the validity of prospect 
theory with (3). Under prospect theory with (3), the 6 values of the loss aversion coefficients 
that we observed should be equal. The order in which these questions were asked was 
random. We repeated the third iteration of two randomly determined questions to test for 
consistency. 
 
 19
Analysis 
As mentioned before, we used a power specification for utility. To test the robustness 
of our findings we also explored two other parametric specifications: exponential, and expo-
power. The power and exponential specification are widely used in economics and decision 
analysis. The expo-power family was proposed by Abdellaoui, Barrios, and Wakker (2007). 
The goodness of fit, as measured by the sum of squared errors, did not differ significantly 
between the three families (p = 0.100). Convergence of the estimations was better for power 
and expo-power than for exponential. The results based on expo and expo-power were similar 
to the results for the power family. The results were also similar when we took for each 
subject the family that best fitted his data.  
The power family for gains is defined by xα and for losses by −(−x)β with α,β > 0. For 
gains (losses), the power function is concave if α < 1 (β < 1), linear if α = 1 (β = 1), and 
convex if α > 1 (β > 1). For the power family the loss aversion coefficient λ is defined as 
−U(−1)
U(1)  . This is the definition implicitly adopted by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Given 
the stakes used in the experiment, this definition is also close to the definition of Köbbering 
and Wakker (2005) in our study. 
 Based on the obtained estimates for the power coefficient we could classify 
individuals according to the shape of their utility for gains and the shape of their utility for 
losses. We used two classifications. In the first classification, a subject was classified as 
concave (convex) for gains if the power estimate for gains was less than (greater than) 1. For 
losses a subject was classified as convex (concave) if the power estimate for losses was less 
than (greater than) 1. In the second classification, which was included to examine the 
robustness of the first classification, we only counted the number of subjects for whom the 
power coefficient differed statistically significantly from 1 based on the standard error that 
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resulted from the nonlinear least squares estimation. This second classification led to similar 
conclusions as the first and, hence, these data are not reported separately. 
 In each question, a subject was risk averse if the certainty equivalent was less than the 
expected value of the prospect, risk neutral if the certainty equivalent was equal to the 
expected value of the prospect, and risk seeking if the certainty equivalent exceeded the 
expected value of the prospect. To account for response error, we classified a subject as risk 
averse for gains (losses) if at least 8 out of 12 certainty equivalence questions involving gains 
(losses) produced a risk averse answer. Similarly, a subject was classified as risk neutral 
(seeking) if at least 8 out of 12 questions produced a risk neutral (seeking) answer.  
 For loss aversion we computed for each subject the median of the six elicited loss 
aversion coefficients. A subject was classified as loss averse if this median exceeded 1 and as 
gain seeking if it was less than 1. 
 We will focus on the medians in what follows. The results for the means were similar. 
Significance of differences was tested by the Wilcoxon test and by the Friedman test (for 
comparisons between more than two variables). The binomial test was used to test for 
differences between proportions.  
 
5. Results 
Reliability 
 One subject was excluded because she did not understand the task. This left 47 
subjects in the final analysis. In the analysis of loss aversion we excluded another five 
subjects because they were not willing to trade any loss for a gain regardless how small the 
loss.  
The reliability of the responses was good. In 95.6% of the cases, the replication of the 
first iteration led to the same choice as the first iteration. In 66% of the cases, the replication 
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of the third iteration led to the same choice. The lower reliability in the third iteration is not 
surprising because the stimulus value was generally close to the certainty equivalent in the 
third iteration. The reliability in the repeat of the third iteration was comparable to the 
reliability observed in previous studies (for an overview see Table 1 in Stott (2006). In the 
repeat of the first iteration the reliability was much better, which is not surprising given that 
these involved choices for which most subjects had a clear preference for one of the two 
options. 
 
Consistency 
 The consistency tests supported prospect theory. We neither observed significant 
differences between the utility for gains elicited using pg = ½ and the utility for gains elicited 
using pg = ⅔ (p = 0.492) nor between the utility for losses elicited using pl = ½ and the utility 
for losses elicited using pl = ⅓ (p = 0.320). Because utility did not depend on the probability 
used in the elicitation, we will mainly focus on the results for pg = pl = ½ in what follows.  
 
Table 3: Elicited loss aversion coefficients from the 6 mixed prospects. 
 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 
Median 2.24 2.50 2.77 2.86 2.54 3.01 
IQR 1.12-7.27 1.36-4.23 1.48-6.51 1.41-6.30 1.71-3.58 1.23-6.39 
IQR stands for interquartile range 
 
Table 3 shows the median loss aversion coefficients elicited from the six mixed 
prospects. Although there is some variation in the medians, we could not reject the null 
hypothesis that the 6 elicited loss aversion coefficients were equal. This is consistent with 
prospect theory and (3) and we will henceforth pool the observations from the six loss 
aversion questions. 
  
 22
Table 4: Median elicited certainty equivalents (absolute values).  
Gains Losses  
Question pg = ½ pg = ⅔ pl = ⅓ pl = ½ 
1 900 
(697−900) 
1115 
(780−1200) 
590 
(550−860) 
900 
(840−1090) 
2 1810 
(1310−1810) 
2235 
(1740−2405) 
1575 
(860−2110) 
2185 
(1810−2185) 
3 2525 
(1965−2715) 
2625 
(1625−3375) 
1810 
(1685−2625) 
3275 
(2105−4025) 
4 4215 
(2260−4525) 
4365 
(3950−6030) 
3950 
(2175−4365) 
4525 
(4215−5775) 
5 7810 
(7210−8185) 
8235 
(7575−8780) 
7200 
(7115−7575) 
7810 
(7685−8185) 
6 8900 
(8690−9090) 
9115 
(8860−9200) 
8780 
(8530−9050) 
8900 
(8840−9040) 
Interquartile ranges are in parentheses. 
 
Median certainty equivalents and risk attitude 
Table 4 shows the median responses to the 24 certainty equivalence questions used to 
elicit the utility for gains and the utility for losses and their interquartile ranges. The table 
shows that the dominant pattern is risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses, but for 
losses subjects were closer to being risk neutral than for gains. For gains, the certainty 
equivalent of a prospect is always lower than its expected value, consistent with risk aversion. 
Overall, 74% of the choices were consistent with risk aversion for pg = ½ and 81% for pg = 
⅔. For losses and pl = ½, there is risk seeking in each question (the expected value is smaller 
than the certainty equivalent). For pl = ⅓, there is risk seeking in 3 questions and risk 
aversion in the other 3. Overall, 59% of the choices were consistent with risk seeking for pl = 
1/2, but only 46% for pl = ⅓. The difference between the certainty equivalent and the 
expected value is generally larger for gains than for losses. 
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Table 5: Classification of subjects in terms of risk attitude 
 Losses 
  Risk averse Risk seeking Mixed Total 
Risk averse 15 10 10 35 
Risk seeking 0 3 0 3 
Mixed 1 7 1 9 
 
Gains 
Total 16 20 11 47 
 
 Table 5 shows the classification of the subjects in terms of their risk attitude for gains 
and for losses. Risk aversion was dominant for gains, the difference between risk averse and 
risk seeking was highly significant (p < 0.001). The proportion of risk averse subjects that we 
observed was comparable to the proportion observed in previous studies (Schoemaker 1990; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Fennema and van Assen 1998; Abdellaoui 2000; Abdellaoui, 
Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv forthcoming; Baucells and Villasis 2006). For losses the picture 
was more varied. Risk seeking was most common but the difference between the proportion 
of risk seeking subjects and the proportion of risk averse subjects was not significant (p = 
0.617). The proportion of risk seeking subjects that we observed was generally lower than in 
previous studies, the exception being Booij and van de Kuilen (2006). When we combine risk 
attitudes for gains and for losses, the most common pattern is risk aversion both for gains and 
for losses. The proportion of subjects who were risk averse both for gains and for losses was, 
however, not significantly different from the proportion of subjects who were risk averse for 
gains and risk seeking for losses (p = 0. 424) and was considerably lower than the proportion 
observed in previous studies, except for Booij and van de Kuilen (2006). 
 Consistent with previous studies we observed strong risk aversion in the mixed 
prospects. Table 6 shows the median results in the mixed prospects. The size of the loss that 
established indifference was typically around half the size of the corresponding gain. Overall, 
80.5% of choices were risk averse. At the individual level, the degree of risk aversion was 
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comparable to the degree of risk aversion in the pure gains prospects: 36 subjects were risk 
averse, 9 risk seeking, and 2 were classified as mixed.  
 
Table 6: Median Results in the Mixed Prospects.  
Question G
*
j  L
*
j  
1 900 
(697−900) 
515 
(313−910) 
2 1810 
(1310−1810) 
980 
(532−1528) 
3 2525 
(1965−2715) 
1370 
(610−2050) 
4 4215 
(2260−4525) 
2040 
(910−3772) 
5 7810 
(7210−8185) 
3710 
(2320−5128) 
6 8900 
(8690−9090) 
4000 
(1840−6570) 
   Interquartile ranges in parentheses. 
  
Utility for gains and losses 
 
 Figure 2 displays the elicited utility function based on the median data. The estimated 
parameters are given in Table 7. The elicited utility function was not entirely consistent with 
the conjecture of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that utility is S-shaped. For gains the 
function was concave. The median power coefficient of 0.86 differed significantly from 1 (p 
= 0.041) and was close and not significantly different from the power coefficients found in 
most previous studies. The interquartile range for the power coefficient indicated 
considerable variation at the individual level.  
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Figure 2: The Elicited Utility Function Based on the Median Data
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For losses, however, we did not observe convexity, but slight concavity. The median 
power estimate of 1.06 differed significantly from 1 (p = 0.015). Our median estimate was 
also significantly different from the medians found in earlier studies that estimated the utility 
for losses (p < 0.001).  
 
Table 7: Estimation results 
 Power estimate gains Power estimate losses Loss aversion coefficient 
Median 0.86 1.06 2.61 
IQR 0.66−1.08 0.92−1.49 1.51−5.51 
IQR stands for interquartile range 
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The individual estimates are displayed in Appendix C. Table 8 shows the 
classification of subjects based on their power estimates. The most common pattern was 
concave utility for gains and concave utility for losses. The proportion of subjects with an 
everywhere concave utility function was, however, not significantly different from the 
proportion of subjects with an S-shaped utility function (p = 0.487).  For gains, concave 
utility was clearly the dominant pattern and the proportion of concave subjects was 
significantly different from the proportion of convex subjects (p = 0.008). For losses, concave 
utility was also the most common pattern, but the proportion of concave subjects was not 
significantly different from the proportion of convex subjects (p = 0.243).  
 
Table 8: Classification of subjects according to the shape of their utility function. 
  Losses 
 Concave Convex Total 
Concave 19 14 33 
Convex 9 5 14 
 
 
Gains 
Total 28 19 47 
 
 It is of interest to compare the findings of Tables 6 and 8. In Table 6 we observed that 
for losses most subjects were risk seeking. In Table 8 we observed that most subjects had 
concave utility for losses. These findings illustrate that there is no one-to-one relationship 
between risk aversion and concave utility under prospect theory and that concave utility and 
risk seeking behavior can and in fact do occur simultaneously. These results provide 
empirical evidence for the theoretical results derived by Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994). 
 
Loss aversion 
We found clear evidence of loss aversion. Table 7 shows the results at the aggregate 
level. The median of the individual loss aversion coefficients differed significantly from 1 (p 
= 0.000), the case of no loss aversion. It was also significantly different from the findings of 
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Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (p = 0.029), but not from teh findings of Abdellaoui, 
Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (forthcoming) (p = 0.116). The interquartile range showed 
considerable variation at the individual level. 
Loss aversion was clearly the dominant pattern at the individual level. Thirty-six 
subjects (76.6%) had a median loss aversion coefficient that exceeded 1 and were classified 
as loss averse. Only 6 subjects had a median loss aversion coefficient less than 1 and were 
classified as gain seeking. For 5 subjects all loss aversion coefficients exceeded 10 and they 
were not classified. The proportion of loss averse subjects was significantly different from the 
proportion of gain seeking subjects (p = 0.000). The support for loss aversion that we 
observed at the individual level is comparable with the findings of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, 
and Paraschiv (forthcoming). 
 
Probability weighting 
 Recall that our estimation procedure also yielded some information on probability 
weighting. Table 9 summarizes our estimations. The table shows that our, admittedly limited, 
results were broadly consistent with inverse S-shaped probability weighting. For a probability 
of ⅓ we observe no probability weighting for losses (p = 0.710). For probability ½ there is 
small but significant underweighting of probability both for gains (p = 0.030) and for losses 
(p = 0.003). There is more pronounced underweighting of ⅔ for gains (p = 0.000). The results 
were similar to those obtained in earlier studies. For example, Abdellaoui (2000) found that 
w−(⅓) = 0.35, w−(½) = 0.46, w+(½) = 0.39, and w+(⅔) = 0.50. Only w+(½) differed 
significantly from Abdellaoui (2000) (p = 0.006, the other p-values all exceeded 0.40).  
We could not reject the null hypothesis that w+(½) = w−(½) (p = 0.35). Hence, we 
could not reject the hypothesis that the degree of probability weighting was the same for 
gains and for losses for a probability of ½. 
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Table 9: Results on probability weighting 
 Median Interquartile range 
w+(½) 0.46 0.36−0.54 
w+(⅔) 0.53 0.43−0.70 
w−(⅓) 0.34 0.25−0.42 
w− (½) 0.45 0.36−0.53 
 
Comparison with expected utility 
Table 10 shows the obtained power estimates under expected utility, i.e. when we 
assume that people do not transform probabilities. The table clearly illustrates that the 
existence of probability weighting implies that expected utility leads to distorted utilities. 
First, the power coefficients under expected utility were indeed generally different from those 
obtained under prospect theory. For gains, they are both significantly lower than under 
prospect theory (p = 0.041 when probability ½ was used in the elicitation and p < 0.001 when 
probability ⅔ was used in the elicitation) showing that expected utility overestimates the 
degree of concavity of utility for gains when subjects underweight probabilities. A second 
indication that expected utility leads to biased utilities is that the power coefficients for pg = 
½ and pg = ⅔ were significantly different (p < 0.001). The dependence of utility on the 
probability used in the elicitation entails another violation of expected utility. 
 
Table 10: Power estimates under expected utility 
 Gains Losses 
 pg = ½ pg = ⅔ pl = ⅓ pl = ½ 
Median 0.80 0.53 1.06 0.90 
IQR 0.51−0.87 0.42−0.73 0.77−1.36 0.80−1.25 
IQR stands for interquartile range. 
For losses, the power coefficient was significantly different from the power 
coefficient under prospect theory for probability ½ (p = 0.009) but not for probability ⅓ (p = 
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0.860). The power coefficients for pl = ⅓ and pl = ½ did not differ significantly (p = 0.08). 
That utility for losses under prospect theory did not differ significantly from utility under 
expected utility when the elicitation was performed with pl = ⅓ is consistent with the 
observed absence of probability weighting for pl = ⅓. A similar finding was reported by 
Abdellaoui, Barrios, and Wakker (2007). For pl = ½ expected utility overestimated the degree 
of convexity of the utility for losses consistent with the observed underweighting of ½. In 
fact, under expected utility the utility for losses was convex whereas under prospect theory it 
was slightly concave. This finding suggests that previous measurements that observed convex 
utility for losses and that typically used a probability of ½ in the elicitations were biased 
towards convexity of utility.  
 
6. Discussion 
 This paper has proposed a new and tractable method to measure utility and loss 
aversion under prospect theory. Because the method only uses certainty equivalents for two-
outcome prospects, it is easy to implement in empirical research and in practical decision 
analysis. Analyzing the data by standard regression tools gives the coefficients for the utility 
function. We hope that the provision of such a tractable method will foster the use of prospect 
theory in applications. 
 Our experimental results were broadly consistent with the assumptions of prospect 
theory. We found concave utility for gains, strong evidence for loss aversion, and data on 
probability weighting which were consistent with inverse S-shaped probability weighting. 
Most of our findings were in line with those of previous studies on prospect theory. Under 
prospect theory, the results on utility were robust, in the sense that they were not sensitive to 
the probability used in the elicitation. This offers support for the validity of prospect theory. 
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Finally, we observed that falsely assuming expected utility often leads to substantial biases in 
elicited utilities. 
We observed a high degree of risk aversion for mixed 50-50 prospects. We observed 
only modest curvature of utility, both for gains and for losses, and little probability weighting 
of ½ both for gains and for losses. Hence, the strong degree of risk aversion in 50-50 mixed 
prospects was caused by loss aversion. This finding also emphasizes that ignoring loss 
aversion in the measurement of utility will produce biased utilities. 
 In contrast with the assumptions of prospect theory and with the findings of earlier 
studies, we found no evidence of convex utility for losses. The utility for losses was slightly 
concave in our study whereas previous studies generally found slight convexity. Even though 
we found concave utility for losses, risk seeking was the dominant pattern for losses. This 
illustrates that the one-to-one relationship between utility curvature and risk attitude, which 
exists under expected utility, is no longer present under prospect theory.  
Although the difference in the observed shape of utility for losses was relatively 
modest compared with previous studies that measured utility under prospect theory, it is 
worth reflecting why this difference may have occurred. One difference with earlier studies is 
that our elicitation was based on certainty equivalents whereas most previous studies used the 
trade-off method. It is, however, hard to see why the trade-off method would lead to more 
convexity. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) also elicited certainty equivalents but, as 
mentioned before, they imposed parametric assumptions about probability weighting.  
Another difference with studies that used the trade-off method was that we imposed 
parametric assumptions for utility. It is possible that the outcome of the nonlinear least 
squares analysis was not unique but that there was a range of values for which the goodness 
of fit was broadly similar. For example, risk seeking for losses can both be explained by a 
less elevated probability weighting function and by convex utility for losses. We tested the 
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results of our analysis by different statistical algorithms and found that the results were 
stable, however, suggesting that convergence problems and interactions between the 
parameters have not been driving the difference in findings.  
Combining the available evidence from this and previous studies, it seems safe to 
conclude that the utility for losses is closer to linearity than the utility for gains and that 
curvature of utility for losses does not contribute much to observed risk attitudes. For all 
practical purposes, to take utility for losses linear does not seem to lead to substantial 
distortions. Of course, this conclusion only holds at the aggregate level. At the individual 
level the picture is much more diverse. For individual decisions, individual prospect theory 
parameters must be elicited. It is here that our method can prove particularly useful.  
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Appendix A: Illustration of questions 
 
Figure A-1: Illustration of  a task in the gain domain 
 
Figure A-2: Illustration of a task in the mixed domain 
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Appendix B: Explanation of the bisection method 
The bisection method used to generate the iterations is illustrated in Table A1 for L1 
for pl = ⅓ and the elicitation of L
*
6 for pg = pl = ½. The prospect that is chosen is printed in 
bold. Starting values in the iterations were always chosen so that prospects had equal 
expected value. Depending on the choice made, the certain outcome was increased or 
decreased. The size of the change was always half the size of the change in the previous 
question with the restriction that numbers should always be a multiple of 10. When a number 
was not a multiple of 10 it was rounded downwards. The method resulted in an interval 
within which the indifference value should lie. The midpoint of this interval was taken as the 
indifference value. For example, in Table A1 the indifference value for L*6 should lie between  
−3960 and −3680. Then we took as the indifference value −3820. In the elicitation of utility 
on the gains and loss domains, the certainty equivalents were elicited in five iterations. In the 
determination of the loss aversion coefficients, we used six iterations. We used one additional 
iteration in the determination of the loss aversion coefficients because the intervals G*j − L*j 
were larger than the intervals 6xj − yj6. 
 
Table A1: An illustration of the bisection method. 
Iteration Offered choices in elicitation of L1 Offered choices in elicitation of L*6 
1 −660 vs. (−2000, ; 0) 0 vs. (9090, ½; −9090) 
2 −330 vs. (−2000, ; 0) 0 vs. (9090, ½; −4540) 
3 −490 vs. (−2000, ; 0) 0 vs. (9090, ½; −2270) 
4 −410 vs. (−2000, ; 0) 0 vs. (9090, ½; −3400) 
5 −450 vs. (−2000, ; 0) 0 vs. (9090, ½; −3960) 
6  0 vs. (9090, ½; −3680) 
Indifference value −430 −3820 
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Appendix C: Overview of the individual results 
Power function parameter Subject 
Gains Losses 
Loss aversion 
1 1.12 0.68 1.67 
2 1.58 3.02 5.51 
3 0.77 0.91 2.16 
4 0.44 1.10 4.37 
5 0.78 1.63 1.15 
6 0.89 0.99 12.23 
7 0.27 1.28 11.83 
8 0.96 1.04 2.35 
9 1.66 0.95 0.86 
10 0.86 1.00 2.00 
11 1.10 1.28 0.47 
12 0.41 1.50 Inf 
13 1.00 1.00 0.77 
14 1.18 1.22 4.69 
15 0.45 0.76 4.37 
16 2.11 2.23 2.71 
17 0.83 0.92 1.32 
18 0.55 1.03 4.54 
19 0.71 1.12 6.02 
20 0.84 1.16 3.11 
21 1.69 1.07 0.39 
22 1.07 0.87 1.03 
23 0.72 0.93 1.76 
24 0.92 0.73 6.35 
25 1.32 1.26 9.51 
26 0.77 2.83 Inf 
27 0.73 0.81 1.73 
28 0.87 1.00 1.87 
29 0.45 1.75 24.21 
30 0.54 0.90 2.74 
31 0.80 2.84 2.35 
32 0.70 0.96 4.26 
33 0.61 1.10 7.47 
34 0.91 2.35 25.23 
35 1.58 0.91 0.34 
36 0.75 5.33 Inf 
37 0.99 0.92 0.99 
38 0.54 0.79 3.29 
39 2.06 0.96 1.44 
40 1.28 1.70 1.67 
41 0.42 1.12 7.00 
42 0.88 0.64 1.51 
43 0.91 1.49 2.52 
44 1.19 3.22 Inf 
45 0.96 1.55 3.05 
46 0.47 0.93 9.92 
47 0.12 1.07 Inf 
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